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CIVIL PROCEDURE:
PLIED

TO

DISTRICT

THE

De Novo

COURT

STANDARD OF REVIEW AP-

INTERPRETATIONS

OF

STATE

LAw-McLinn v. F/V Fjord, 739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984).
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is a settled rule of civil procedure that upon appellate review, a
question of fact must not be set aside unless it is "clearly erroneous." 1
The United States Supreme Court has held that a finding of fact is
"clearly erroneous" when, although there is evidence to support it, the
appellate court, upon review of the entire evidence, is left with the firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.2 In contrast, conclusions of
law are not insulated by the "clearly erroneous" standard. Rather, conclusions of law are freely reviewable by the appellate court.' The reviewing court is required to make its own independent determinations
regarding legal standards and their application to the facts at issue.4
Confusion has arisen in the federal appellate courts as to what
standard of review is to be applied to a district court's determinations
concerning state law when there has been no definitive interpretation of
that law by the highest court of the state.' The standard most often
articulated by the United States Courts of Appeals6 has been labeled
the "deferential standard," which requires that great weight be given
I. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Rule 52(a) provides: "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses." Id.
2. United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) (a mistake which would support
reversal under a clear error standard would occur when findings are not supported by substantial
evidence). See also Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1302 (3rd Cir. 1972) (reversal is proper
when findings are contrary to the clear weight of the evidence or where findings bear no rational
relationship to the supporting data). See generally 5A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1 52.03[1], at 52-22 (2d ed. 1985) ("It is well-settled that the reviewing court may not

set aside a finding of fact merely because it would have viewed the facts differently, or given
greater weight to certain evidence than the trial court.").
3. See United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 526 (1961). See
also 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2588, at 750, 752-53
(1971).
4.

C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 2588, at 750, 752-53.

5. The confusion is apparent from the varying articulations of the standard for appellate
review enunciated between different circuits and within the same circuit. See, e.g., Waegemann v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 713 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983) (clearly wrong standard); South

Pasadena v. Goldschmidt, 637 F.2d 677, 679 (9th Cir. 1981) (substantial deference is owed);
Scandanavian Airlines Sys. v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 1979) (entitled
to great weight); Aurora v. Bechtel Corp., 599 F.2d 382, 386 (10th Cir. 1979) (extraordinary
force); Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 561 F.2d 202, 204 (10th Cir.
1977) (review is governed by clearly erroneous rule).

6. McLinn v. F/V Fjord, 739 F.2d 1395, 1404 (9th Cir. 1984).
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to the federal district judge's conclusions on state law, due to his or her
knowledge and expertise in the law of his or her state.7 Another standard, frequently articulated by the United States Courts of Appeals is
the "clearly erroneous" standard, which requires the appellate court to
follow the district court's interpretation of state law unless it is "clearly
wrong." 8 The wording of the standard would indicate that it is the
same standard of review that is applied to findings of fact under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52. 9
In response to the confusion, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in McLinn v. F/V Fjord,'0 announced with certainty the standard of review that the federal appellate courts should apply to district
court decisions on state law. In the McLinn decision, the court departed
from its previous use of the "deferential" and the "clearly erroneous"
standards," and declared that questions of state law were to be reviewed under an independent de novo standard."
This casenote will examine the reasons behind the McLinn decision, and how those reasons override concerns for stare decisis. Despite
the appearance of a radical departure from precedent, the application
of a de novo standard of review is not truly revolutionary in practice.
The note will demonstrate that the McLinn decision primarily presents
a change in appellate focus and terminology, rather than a change in
Ninth Circuit appellate procedure. Finally, the casenote will explore
the practical ramifications posed by the Ninth Circuit's adoption of the
de novo standard of review.
II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

3
McLinn v. F/V Fjord"
is an admiralty case involving a personal
injury action and a wrongful death action which arose from a collision
between two skiffs off the coast of Kodiak Island, Alaska.14 The plaintiffs asserted an in personam liability claim against two of the defendants pursuant to an Alaska statute.' 5 The Supreme Court of Alaska,

7. Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459, 466 (5th Cir. 1967). Under the so-called
"deferential" standard, the United States court of appeals must accept the district judge's decision
unless it is clearly wrong. Harris v. Hercules, Inc., 455 F.2d 267, 269 (8th Cir. 1972); Kirby v.
United States, 329 F.2d 735, 737 (10th Cir. 1964).
8. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. American Guar. Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 1490,
1500 (9th Cir. 1984); Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 872 (10th Cir. 1982); Universal Elec.
Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 643 F.2d 1240, 1247 (6th Cir. 1981).
9. See supra note I and accompanying text.
10. 739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984).
II. Id. at 1397.
12. Id.
13. 739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984).
14. Id. at 1397.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/7
15. Id. The Alaska statute reads in pertinent part:
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however, had not provided a definitive interpretation of the statute.1 6
The district judge, who originally heard the case, held that the statute
did not apply to the circumstances of the case, and denied the plaintiffs
17
damages.
On appeal, the three-judge appellate panel for the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit believed the controlling factor for their decision was the standard of review to be applied to a district judge's conclusions on state law. 1 8 As a result, the panel unanimously requested en
banc review. 1 9 The appellate panel indicated that it would affirm if the
"deferential" standard, which permits reversal only for clear error, applied, 20 but that it would reverse the district court's decision under an
independent, de novo standard . 2 The en banc court, in considering
which standard of review to apply, noted that the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit had reviewed previous district court conclusions on
state law under a "deferential" standard, accepting the district judge's
construction of state law unless clearly wrong.2 2 The court went on,
however, to denounce its past practice and to adopt the rule that questions of state law are reviewable under the same independent de novo
standard as are questions of federal law.2 3 The majority reasoned that
the application of any standard which provided less than full, independent de novo review of legal issues would be an abdication of its appel24
late responsibility.
The Ninth Circuit majority was met with severe criticism by the
dissent. According to the dissent, the decision to apply a de novo standard of review was not only a major departure from Ninth Circuit appellate practice, but it was contrary to all reported decisions by other
circuits, and it was adverse to the views of scholarly authorities. 25 The
dissent stated that it agreed with the majority position that an appel-

The owner of a watercraft is liable for injury or damage caused by the negligent operation of his watercraft whether the negligence consists of a violation of a state statute, or
neglecting to observe ordinary care in the operation of the watercraft as the rules of common law require. The owner is not liable, however, unless his watercraft is used with his
express or implied consent ....
ALASKA STAT. § 05.25.040 (1981).
16. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1397.
17. Id. The district court held, as a matter of law, that the Alaska statute did not impose
liability on the defendants because the skiff they operated was not a "watercraft" as defined by
the Alaska Code. Id. See ALASKA STAT. § 05.25.100(4) (1981).
18. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1397.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
Id. at 1398. 1985
Published24.
by eCommons,
25. Id. at 1403 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
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late court may freely review questions of law and that it is not confined
to the "clearly erroneous" standard which applies to questions of fact.2"
Nevertheless, the dissent argued that the standard of review for district
court interpretations of state law should be one of "substantial deference"17 in which special weight is given to the district judge's
decision 28
III.

BACKGROUND

Unresolved questions of state law traditionally have been problematic to the federal courts. Prior to 1938, under the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson,2 9 the federal courts asserted the power to create general federal
common law, absent a specific state statute on point.30 The power to
create federal common law was curtailed by the United States Supreme Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins."1 The Court in Erie
declared that there was no general federal common law, and overturned the Swift doctrine.3 2 In essence the Erie decision provides that a
federal court's function is not- to choose the rule that it would adopt if
it were free to do so, but to choose the rule that it believes the state
court would be likely to adopt in the future. 3
Confusion has arisen in the federal appellate courts as to the standard of review to be applied to district court interpretations of state
law, particularly in situations where the highest state court has not provided definitive guidance.34 From the uncertainty, four different standards for review have emerged.3 5 As a result, the circuits have applied
different standards of review to district court determinations on state
law. Furthermore, different standards of review have been applied to
appellate cases within the same circuit.36
Some federal appellate courts indicate that a district court's interpretation of state law will be accepted unless it is shown to be clearly
wrong. 3 7 Under this standard, the appellate court is bound -by the dis-

26. Id. at 1405.
27. Id. at 1406.
28. Id. The dissent claimed that the purpose of the "substantial deference" standard is to
prevent hasty, arbitrary decisions by appellate courts on issues of local law with which the appellate court is much less familiar than is the district judge. Id.
29. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
30. Id. at 19.
31. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
32. Id. at 78.
33. Id. See also C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 59, at 271-78
(3d ed. 1976).
34. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 37-43-and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 5. See also infra note 44 and accompanying text.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/7
37. See, e.g., King v. Horizon Corp., 701 F.2d 1313, 1315 (10th Cir. 1983); Loveridge v.
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trict judge's decision, unless clear error is determined. 8 Other appellate courts have announced that "great weight" or "deference" should
be afforded to a district judge's determination of state law. 3 9 The practical reason asserted for giving great weight to the district court's decision is that the appellate court can benefit greatly from the district
judge's past experience and day-to-day familiarity with state law issues. 40 Other courts articulate a hybrid standard, under which appellate courts give great weight to the district judge's interpretation of
state law, reversing only upon finding that the district court's decision
was clearly erroneous."1 In a minority of decisions, district court conclusions on state law have been reviewed under a de novo standard. 2
Under de novo review, the appellate court is neither comnpelled to adhere to the district judge's interpretation of state law, nor does it give
great weight to his or her interpretation. Rather, the appellate court
makes its own independent determination of state law issues based
upon recognized sources that are available to the parties and that may
be argued before the district court as well as before the appellate
court.'3
Prior to the McLinn v. F/V Fjord decision, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit applied three different standards of review to district court conclusions on state law questions. A review of the Ninth
Circuit cases indicates that the "clearly erroneous" standard, the "substantial deference" standard, and a hybrid standard of review had been

Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 877 (10th Cir. 1982); Walgreen Ariz. Drug Co. v. Levitt, 670 F.2d 860,
863 (9th Cir. 1982).
38. McLinn v. F/V Fjord, 739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984). The dissent in McLinn explained
that an articulation of the standard of review as "clearly erroneous" connotes that a district
court's decision on a legal issue binds the appellate court just as a district court's finding of fact
binds the appellate court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52. Id. at 1405. (Schroeder, J.,
dissenting). The result has been a tendency by the appellate courts to accord presumptive validity
to the district court's legal conclusions. For example, in Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l
(Am.) Corp., 707 F.2d 1054, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 1983), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
stated: "Our review of the district court's interpretation of state law ... is limited: we may not
overrule unless it is 'clearly wrong.'" Id. at 1056-57. See also Smith v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 524
F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 1975).
39. See, e.g., Kaufman & Broad Homes Sys. v. International Broth. of Firemen & Oilers,
607 F.2d 1104, 1108 (5th Cir. 1979); Scandinavian Airlines Sys. v. United Aircraft Corp., 601
F.2d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 1979); Ritzau v. Warm Springs W., 589 F.2d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1979);
Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561 F.2d 807, 816 (10th Cir. 1977).
40. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2588, at
752-53 (1971).
41. See, e.g., In re Winters, 586 F.2d 1363, 1366 (10th Cir. 1978); C. R. Fedrick, Inc. v.
Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 1977).
42. See, e.g., Yamaguchi v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 706 F.2d 940, 946 n.5 (9th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Rosales, 584 F.2d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 1978); Phoenix Title & Trust
Co. v. Stewart, 337 F.2d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 979 (1965).
Published
by eCommons, 1985
43. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1400.
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applied." Two recent decisions by the court indicate a departure from
deferring to district court decisions on state law issues. In Bank of California v. Opie,45 the appellate court stated that the district court's interpretation of state law was "entitled to little or no special deference"
because the state authority offered "little more than general guidance
inthe case .. "46 In Insurance Co. of North America v. Howard,'7
the court of appeals relied on Opie to conclude that a district court
decision was entitled to "no deference whatsoever" because the district
court had neither cited nor discussed any state law pertaining to the
issue it decided.' 8
The McLinn court, while rejecting the "substantial deference"
standard, also abrogated the use of the "clearly erroneous" standard.49
The Ninth Circuit, however, was not the first circuit to do so. Several
years prior to the McLinn decision, the Eighth Circuit similarly abandoned use of the "clear error" standard. 50 However, unlike the Ninth
Circuit, the Eighth Circuit replaced its "clear error" standard with the
"substantial deference" standard. 51 To date, the Eighth Circuit is the
only other circuit to express concern over the confusion caused by application of the "clear error" standard. The balance of the circuits continues to apply all three standards of review to district court decisions
on state law.
The majority in McLinn recognized the problems caused by the

44. See, e.g., Donaldson v. United States, 653 F.2d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1981) (clearly erroneous); United States v. Crain, 589 F.2d 996, 1001 n.8 (9th Cir. 1979) (great weight); C. R.
Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 1977) (hybrid: "[a]nalysis by a
district judge of the law of the state in which he sits . . .is entitled to great weight. . . That
determination 'will be accepted on review unless shown to be clearly wrong.' ") (quoting Owens v.
White, 380 F.2d 310, 315 (9th Cir. 1967)).
45. 633 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1981).
46. Id. at 980.
47. 679 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1982).
48. Id. at 150.
49. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1397.
50. Luke v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 1015, 1019-20 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit pointed out that it had
often stated that where the trial judge arrived at a permissible conclusion with respect to the law
of his or her state, the conclusion is binding on appeal. Id. at 1019 n.6. The court further noted
that the legal effect of the principle on questions of first impression was to preclude appellate
consideration of an issue involving a significant question of law. Id. The Eighth Circuit abandoned
this approach because it believed it to be an abdication of appellate responsibility. Id. at 1019-20.
51. Id. at 1019 n.6. The court explained the new standard to mean that the appellate court
was not bound by the district judge's initial decision on state law. The appellate court was to
accord great weight to the district judge's view on state law, but the parties were entitled to a
review of the trial court's determinations on state law just as they were on any other legal question
in the case. Id. The "deferential" standard is the same standard that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit most frequently applies to review district court decisions. See, e.g.,
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/7
Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459, 466 (5th Cir. 1967).
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"'clear error," the "deferential," and the hybrid standards and consequently abandoned them.52 The majority explained that because those
standards provided for less than a full, independent review of state law
issues, they did not serve the appellate function, which entitles every
party to complete, considered, and impartial review of the trial court's
decision.5 3 The McLinn court determined that the only standard of re-

view that appropriately served the appellate function was the de novo
standard; thus, it adopted that standard of review for the Ninth
54

Circuit.

IV.

ANALYSIS

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
McLinn v. F/V Fjord5 5 rejected the "clear error" and the "deferential"
standards for appellate review, because it concluded that it could carry
out its role within the federal court structure only by reviewing all
questions of law, whether they were issues of state or federal law,
under the independent de novo standard. 5 The majority justified adoption of the de novo standard of review on two grounds. First, the court
asserted that the basic policy concerns behind the application of a different standard of review to questions of law than that which is applied
to questions of fact supported de novo review of all legal issues. 57 Second, the court asserted that the basic structural differences between
trial courts and appellate courts mandated de novo review, because appellate courts are better suited than are trial courts to decide questions
of law. 58 Moreover, the McLinn court explained how the "clear error"
and the "deferential" standards failed to serve the appellate function
within the federal court structure because they afforded less than com-,
59
plete independent review.

52. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1398.
53. Id. The impropriety of a rule which precludes appellate consideration of an issue involving a significant question of law was pointed out in the concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter
in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 209 (1956), where he stated: "[Tihe defendant is
entitled to have the view of the Court of Appeals on Vermont law and cannot, under the Act of
Congress, be foreclosed by the District Court's interpretation." See also Huddleston v. Dwyer,
322 U.S. 232, 236 (1944) ("It is the duty of the federal appellate courts, as well as the trial court,
to ascertain and apply the state law where . . . [it] controls [the] decision.").
54. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1397. See generally Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 216-18 (1957).
55. 739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984).
56. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1397-98. The court in McLinn stated: "[A] decision to give less
than full independent de novo review to the state law determinations of the district courts would
be an abdication of our appellate responsibility." Id. at 1398.
57. Id. at 1398.
58. Id.
Published
eCommons, 1985
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A. The Structural Relationship Between Trial Courts and Appellate
Courts
The parties to a civil action may appeal "as a matter of right"
from the final judgment of a district court to the federal court of appeals under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.60 The standards of
review that are applied to trial court decisions have been developed to
protect a party's right to appeal by recognizing the structural differences between trial courts and appellate courts.6 1 Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a), 6 2 which allows the appellate court to overturn the
trial court on questions of fact only if clear error is determined, recognizes that the trial court is in a unique position to admit evidence, hear
testimony, and evaluate the demeanor and credibility of witnesses.6 3 On
the other hand, as the McLinn court observed, questions of law are
freely reviewable by the appellate court under a de novo standard, because appellate courts have structural advantages over trial courts in
deciding questions of law." First, appellate judges are not encumbered
by the time consuming process of hearing evidence; therefore, they are
better able to concentrate on legal questions.6 5 Second, there are three
members to an appellate panel whose collaborative judgment is brought
to bear on every case.66 The McLinn court concluded that de novo review of questions of law, and "clear error" review of questions of fact
served the same policy concern: to minimize judicial error by assigning
to the court which is better positioned to decide each type of issue the
primary responsibility for doing so.7
McLinn emphasized that the same policy concerns for judicial accuracy and thoroughness apply to questions of state law as they do to
questions of federal law. 6 8 Questions of federal law,6 9 as well as trial

60. FED. R. APP. P. 3. Rule 3 provides: "An appeal permitted by law as of right from a
" Id. See also
district court to a court of appeals shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal ....
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) which provides: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals
" Id. See generally 15 C.
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States ....
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3901, at 398 (1976).
61. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1398.
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
63. Id. The language of Rule 52(a) reflects upon the unique position of trial courts to make
credibility determinations: "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."

Id.
64. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1398.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. The de novo standard of review is applied to a trial court's determinations of federal law
questions. See Harsh Inv. Corp. v. Bialac, 712 F.2d 426, 429 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/7
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court determinations of foreign law, 0 are always reviewed de novo.
McLinn pointed out that there is no justification to impose a lesser appellate duty when a court reviews a question of state law than is applied when a court reviews questions of federal or foreign law. The appellate function as to questions of law are the same in each case, and
the same structural advantages which support de novo review of questions of federal and foreign law, support de novo review of questions of
state law. 7 To emphasize the impropriety of appellate review under
any standard other than the de novo standard, the majority noted that
if the parties were to proceed in state court to appeal a state law issue,
they would have the right to de novo review of the trial judge's determination by an appellate panel having the same structural advantages
as those possessed by the United States Courts of Appeals." McLinn
demonstrated that the effect of denying de novo review to district court
decisions was to place a greater burden on an appellant who seeks review in the federal forum than he or she would have if he or she had
73
proceeded in state court.
To support the position that the structural differences between
trial courts and appellate courts mandate the application of a de novo
standard of review, the McLinn court relied on several cases in which
the United States Supreme Court had chosen not to review questions of
state law which had been reviewed previously by an intermediate appellate court.7 4 One case cited by the majority was Butner v. United
States75 where the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had reversed the district court on an issue of state law. 76 The Supreme-Court
affirmed the appellate court stating: "We decline to review the statelaw question. ' 77 The McLinn court emphasized the importance of what
the Supreme Court was doing in Butner. The Court was not giving
weight or deference to the district judge's decision, nor to the decision
by the court of appeals; it was simply not reviewing a state law question that had been fully reviewed and determined by the intermediate

Twin Engine Beech Airplane, 533 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1976).
70. See FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1. Rule 44.1 provides that the trial court's determination of
foreign law is to be viewed "as a ruling on a question of law." Id. See also C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2446, at 415 (1971). Wright and Miller interpret
the rule to mean that "the determination [of foreign law] . . . is freely reviewable and is not
limited by the 'clearly erroneous' test." Id.
71. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1398.
72. Id. at 1401.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
76. Id. at 51.
at 57-58. 1985
Published77.by Id.
eCommons,
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appellate court.78 McLinn asserted that the Supreme Court practice necessitated de novo review by the federal appellate courts. The court of
appeals is the first level of appellate review of the trial court's conclusions of law. 7 9 Parties-have a statutory right to appeal state law questions.80 In order for the right to appeal to be meaningful, the appellate
court must exercise its mandatory appellate jurisdiction by giving full,
independent review to the trial court's decision. 8t The de novo standard, which permits the appellate court to exercise complete, independent review, is the only standard under which the appellate court may
carry out its role in the federal court structure.82
B.

The De Novo Standard of Review

One effect of the McLinn court's decision to adopt a de novo standard of review for the Ninth Circuit was to do away with the confusion
that had arisen from the use of the "clear error" and "deferential"
labels.8" More importantly, the decision protects a party's right to appeal,8 by ensuring full, independent, and impartial review of a district
court decision concerning state law. McLinn enunciated a clear and
precise standard for the Ninth Circuit to follow. 85 Therefore, no longer
can there be any variations in the review standards applied to appellate
cases within the Ninth Circuit as -had existed under the "clear error"
and "deferential" standards. Furthermore, adoption of the de novo
standard alleviated the dangers posed by the use of the "clear error"
and the "deferential" standards. Formerly, there had been a tendency
by the appellate court to interpret the "clear error" and the "deferential" standards to mean that the court was bound by the legal conclusion of the trial court.86 The result had been that in several decisions,

78. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1399.
79. FED. R. APP. P. 3.
80. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1399-1400.
81. Id. at 1400. The majority in McLinn emphasized that the situation is different when the
Supreme Court refuses to review an issue of state law than it is when a federal appellate court
does so. McLinn explained that the structure of the federal court system is such that the Supreme
Court may make the jurisprudential decision to conserve its discretionary power to review a state
law issue, because the intermediate appellate panel has exercised its mandatory appellate jurisdiction, giving full, independent review on all legal issues. Id. at 1399. The majority argued that
when an intermediate appellate court defers to the decision of the district judge, the right to
appeal becomes a meaningless right because there has been no independent review of the state law
issue. Id. at 1399-1400.
82. Id. at 1399.
83. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
85. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1397. The court stated: "Today we adopt as the law of the circuit
the rule that questions of state law are reviewable under the same independent de novo standard
as are questions of federal law." Id.
86. Id. at 1405 (Schroeder, J.,dissenting). The dissent in McLinn explained that the articuhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/7
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the appellate court looked only to whether plausible support existed for
the district judge's decision, thus affording it presumptive validity.87
When validity is presumed, the right to appellate review is severely curtailed because there can be no full, independent review by the appellate
court unless clear error is determined.88
The appellate courts interpreted the "clear error" standard to
mean that they were bound by the district court's decision because of
the fact that the standard was so similar to the "clearly erroneous"
standard of review applied to questions of fact under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a).8 9 Pursuant to Rule 52(a), an appellate court is
bound by the trial court's conclusions of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous.9" Blind adherence to district court decisions on state law
under the "clear error" standard undermined the appellate court's role
within the federal court structure, because it usurped the court's power
to conduct full, independent, and impartial review.9 1 The de novo standard articulated by McLinn will prevent any tendency for appellate
courts to adhere blindly to district court decisions, because the standard requires that full, independent review be conducted.
The de novo standard announced in McLinn seemed to be a revolutionary break with precedent. In reality, however, the standard was
not a drastic change in appellate procedure. In spite of the fact that a
majority of appellate opinions paid lip service to the use of the "clear
error" and "deferential" standards, in practice, the appellate courts
conducted independent review to determine' whether the district court's
conclusions were in fact "clearly wrong."9 " The paradox resulted belation of the standard of review as "clearly erroneous" connotes that a district court's decision on
a legal issue binds the appellate court just as a district court's finding on a factual issue binds the
appellate court. Id. The result had been a tendency in some decisions to accord presumptive validity to the district court's conclusions on state law issues. See, e.g., Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v.
Daewoo Int'l (Am.) Corp., 707 F.2d 1054, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 1983); Smith v. Sturm, Ruger &
Co., 524 F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
§ 58, at 240-41 (2d ed. 1970).
87. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
90. Id.
91. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1401. See also Kurland, supra note 54, at 217-18.
92. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. American Guar. Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 1498
(9th Cir. 1984). In Pacific Mutual, the court announced that "[a] district court's determination of
state law will be accepted on review unless it appears to be clearly erroneous." Id. at 1500. The
court then proceeded to conduct an independent, detailed review of the state statute at issue,
comparing the district judge's interpretation to its own to determine whether the district court
decision was "clearly wrong." Id. at 1500-01. In Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 716 F.2d 1194
(8th Cir. 1983), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit asserted that it should give great
weight to the district court's conclusions on local law. Nonetheless, it ultimately determined that
the Iowa Supreme Court would have held differently and, therefore, reversed the district court's
decision. Id. at 1200.
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cause the "clear error" standard was ill-suited to describe the appellate
review process concerning issues of law. Appellate courts cannot apply
the "clear error" standard to questions of law as they can to questions
of fact. Under Rule 52(a), the appellate court reviews the entire evidence to determine whether a mistake has been made regarding the
factual issues.9 3 Under the "clearly erroneous" standard for findings of
fact, a court looks at the hard evidentiary data to determine the presumable conclusions supported by that data. On the other hand, issues
of law cannot be examined under the same "clear error" standard, because they are not based on objective, evidentiary data. Rather, conclusions of law, when there has been no definitive interpretation by the
highest state court, are based on the trial judge's subjective interpretation of state law. To review conclusions of law, the appellate court must
consult all of the relevant sources behind the legal issue which include:
relevant statutes, legislative history, treatises, restatements, and published opinions. Only by conducting its own independent examination
and by making its own independent analysis can the appellate court
determine if the trial court's conclusions of law were clearly wrong.
Thus, in order to carry out the "clear error" standard of review for
legal issues, appellate courts had to conduct independent review of
those issues due to their subjective nature. The McLinn court, in adopting the de novo standard, applied the appropriate label to the appellate
process. Use of the de novo label will ensure that the appellate court
will not review questions of law as if they were questions of fact.
The McLinn decision not only remedies the problems created by
use of the "clear error" standard; it also eliminates the difficulties inherent in use of the "deferential" standard of review. Under the "deferential" standard, great weight was given to the district judge's conclusions on state law issues. 9 As the majority in McLinn pointed out, it is
difficult to determine whether a shift from "clear error" to "great
weight" would require that more or less deference be given to district
court decisions. 95 The flaw in the "deferential" standard lies in the fact
that appellate courts, when they defer to the decision of the district
court, cannot provide parties with full, independent, and impartial determinations on the legal issues involved in the case. There cannot be
deference to district court decisions and full, independent review, be-

93. The mistake standard, which was enunciated in United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.
364 (1948), has been interpreted to mean that "where the evidence would support a conclusion
either way, a choice by the trial judge between two permissible views of the weight of the evidence
is not clearly erroneous." Chancy v. City of Galveston, 368 F.2d 774, 776 (5th Cir. 1966).
94. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
95. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1401.
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cause the concepts are mutually exclusive. 96 If great weight is given to
a district judge's decision, merely because it is his or her decision, there
has been no independent determination of the state law by the appellate tribunal, and the right to appeal has not been fulfilled. Therefore,
the "deferential" standard, like the "clear error" standard, fails to
serve the purpose of appellate review.
Use of the de novo standard of review avoids the problems inherent in according great weight to district court decisions, while it employs the reasoning behind the "deferential" standard of review. The
"deferential" standard is based on the presumption that the district
judge has special expertise in state law due to his or her day-to-day
familiarity with legal issues of the state in which he or she sits.9 7 The
fact that the state judge is an expert in the law of his or her state does
not support use of a review standard that binds appellate courts to the
trial judge's decision. Even though the district judge is an expert in
interpreting and applying the law of the state, he or she is no less an
expert in determining federal law and no deference is given to district
court decisions on federal law. 98 Moreover, both trial court decisions
and appellate court review must be based on recognized sources that
are available to the parties and that can be argued and contested
before the district court as well as before the appellate tribunal. 99 The
sources include: statutes, legislative history, treatises, restatements, and
published opinions. Neither district court nor federal appellate court
decisions can be based on undefined, special knowledge or feelings that
a district judge might have for the law of his or her state. McLinn
asserts that such subjective and elusive bases for decision cannot be
articulated by the trial judge, argued by the parties, or reviewed by the
appellate court. Therefore, such variables cannot form the basis for giving great weight to district court decisions on state law. 100

96. Id.
97. Id. at 1405.
98. Id. at 1400. One commentator points out that the very essence of the Erie doctrine is
that a federal judge can find, if not make, the law almost as well as a state judge. Kurland, supra
note 54, at 217. Kurland goes on to observe that if judicial expertise in the law of the state is
really the test, review of a district court's rulings on state law would be permitted only when the
appellate bench is also made up of judges from the same state or jurisdiction. However, no such
limitation has been proposed. Id.
99. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1400.
100. The McLinn majority points out that one danger in using a review standard based on a
presumption that the district judge has special knowledge of state law issues is the fact that such a
presumption invites investigation into the credentials and experience of each district judge.
McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1400. Such an investigation has occurred in several appellate cases, and
when it has been determined that the district judge lacked experience or credentials, a de novo
standard of review was applied. See, e.g., Yamaguchi v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 706 F.2d
940, 946 n.5 (9th Cir. 1983) (appellate court refused to accord deference to the trial court's
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The de novo standard ensures that appellate review of legal issues
will be based on recognized sources, while it allows the appellate court
to benefit from the district judge's knowledge and expertise on state
law issues. The de novo standard shifts the reviewing court's focus from
the district judge's conclusions of state law to the district judge's reasoning behind those conclusions.10 1 By affording consideration to the
district judge's reasoning, rather than to his or her conclusions, the
danger of blind adherence to the district court decision is avoided, and
full, independent review based on recognized legal sources is carried
out.
C. PracticalEffects of McLinn v. F/V Fjord
The dissent in McLinn v. F/V Fjord argued that the practical effect of the decision would be to pervert and to cripple the federal appellate process.10 2 The dissent's argument asserted that review based on a
de novo, rather than a "deferential" standard, would increase the workload of the federal appellate courts, thus slowing and impeding the appellate process. 0 3 The majority countered that the appellate court, because it is the first level of appellate review, bears the responsibility of
preserving a party's statutory right to appeal questions of state law. In
order to fulfill that duty, the appellate court must provide full and impartial review.10 4 The appellate court's responsibility within the federal
court structure outweighs any desire to conserve judicial resources or to
promote administrative efficiency. 10 5 While the possibility for an increase in appeals exists, in practice, the de novo standard should not
have the effect that the dissent predicts, because most appellate courts,
even while they claim to review under a "clear error" or "deferential"
10 6 Thus, there
standard, conduct full, independent review proceedings.
should be no great encumbrance to appellate efficiency.
The dissent also postulated that the McLinn decision will promote
frivolous appeals, because litigants will believe that district court deci-

decision because the trial judge was sitting by designation).
101. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1400-03. The majority observed that respect for the views of the
district court judge is "inherent in the adversary system which assigns to the appellant the duty to
establish the errors in the trial court's decision." Id. at 1400. The court went on to explain that
the district court's "reasoned explanation for a holding on a question of state law will be given
full, thorough, and respectful consideration, just as it is on questions of federal law." Id. at 1403.
102. Id. (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
105. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1400. The majority stated: "The application of the 'clear error' or
the dissent's 'great weight' standard certainly cannot be justified by any desire to conserve judicial
resources or to promote administrative efficiency." Id.
106. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
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sions will be overturned more easily and more frequently.' ° The dissent's argument fails because it is based on the premise that under a de
novo standard, appellate courts will be more likely to disagree with district court decisions. The dissent's argument misperceives the rationale
behind the de novo standard. De novo review is not based on the premise that appellate judges possess greater wisdom than trial judges.
Rather, de novo review is based on the fact that the appellate process
and the structure of the appellate system mandate full, independent
review of legal issues.1 08 Parties to a civil action may appeal the final
judgment of a district court as a matter of right. 0 9 Appellate courts
must independently review all issues of law. To preserve the right to
appeal, there must be full and impartial review of all legal issues.
The final criticism posed by the dissent predicts that the McLinn
decision will serve as a "disincentive" to district court judges to explore
and explain thoroughly the authorities bearing on the issues of state
law. 1 0 The criticism is clearly at odds with the practical effect that the
de novo standard will have. Under a "clear error" standard, a district
judge, if so inclined, could have dispensed with thorough exploration of
legal issues, safe in the knowledge that his or her decision was insulated
from reversal unless it were blatantly erroneous. Under the de novo
standard, where deference is afforded to the district judge's reasoning
rather than to his or her conclusions, there should be greater incentive
for a district judge to perform a thorough examination of state law
authorities and more reason for a detailed explanation of the reasoning
behind his or her conclusions on legal issues."' As the majority indicated, it is inconceivable that the highly competent district judges,
upon application of the de novo standard, would be dissuaded from
considering issues of state law as fairly and as fully as they consider
questions of federal law.
V.

CONCLUSION

McLinn v. F/V Fjord"' eliminates the confusion in the Ninth Circuit as to the standard of review to be applied to district court conclusions on questions of state law. 3 Under the de novo standard of review, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit must conduct a full,
independent, and impartial review of all legal issues, thus preserving

107.
108.
109.
I1O.
Il1.
112.
113.

McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1406 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 60-92 and accompanying text.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1403 (Schroeder, J.,dissenting).
Id.
739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984).
See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
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the parties' statutory right to appeal. 14 By following the McLinn rule,
an appellate court, being the first level for review of district court deciThat role is
sions, will fulfill its role within the federal court structure.
5
impartially."
and
independently
law
of
to review issues
To date, at least thirteen decisions by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit have applied the de novo standard to review a district
court's decision on state law issues."" Adherence to the McLinn standard ensures that the federal forum, at least in the Ninth Circuit, provides the appellant with the same broad scope of review that he or she
would receive in the state forum." 7 Since the appellate function is the
1 8 The apsame in each forum, the scope of review must be the same.
pellate function is to provide full, independent review of all questions of
law. The de novo standard facilitates independent review; therefore, it
preserves the parties' statutory right to a meaningful appeal.
Tricia Spoerl Murphy

114. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 55-82 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of America, 761 F.2d 553, 555 (9th
Cir. 1985) (cited McLinn and stated: "We review district court interpretations of state law de
novo."); Meckert v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 742 F.2d 505, 506 (9th Cir. 1984) (cited McLinn and
stated: "We review the district court's determination of the issue de novo."); Jewel Co., v. Pay
Less Drug Stores, 741 F.2d 1555, 1560 (9th Cir. 1984) (cited McLinn and stated: "We review the
district court's construction of California law de novo."). See also Perry v. O'Donnell, 749 F.2d
1346, 1348 (9th Cir. 1984); Kline v. Johns-Manville, 745 F.2d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1984); Mingo
v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 537, 538 (9th Cir. 1984).
117. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss1/7
118. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.

